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Recognised and shaped by regulatory strategies pulling in different directions, the European 
consumer may be portrayed as a fractured subject. By drawing from the Pasta and Hormones 
litigation, the article investigates its multiple and heterogeneous identities as resulting from 
the interaction between domestic, EU and WTO law. It argues that the fractured consumer 
could be viewed as a realistic legal projection of the human condition of actual individuals 
engaging in consumer activities, and sets out an adjudicative strategy for assembling its 
identities at an argumentative level so as to do the best by their promises and counter their 
biases. The article concludes by suggesting that the conceptual framework construed around 
the fractured consumer could improve the transparency and contestability of adjudication and 
policy-making. 
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It was in deciding over the substitutability of light wine and beer in a case 
concerning tax discrimination in the United Kingdom1 that the Court of Justice 
famously stated: 
[…] for the purpose of measuring the possible degree of substitution, it 
is impossible to restrict oneself to consumer habits in a member state 
or in a given region. In fact, those habits, which are essentially variable 
in time and space, cannot be considered to be a fixed rule; the tax 
policy of a member state must not therefore crystallize given 
consumer habits so as to consolidate an advantage acquired by 
national industries concerned to comply with them.2 
This passage served to counter the position of the defendant state that, in advocating 
that beer and wine were not similar products nor products in competition for the 
purposes of what is now article 110 TFEU, had observed how in that country beer 
and wine were traditionally perceived as beverages to be consumed for distinct 
purposes.3 By refuting this argument, the Court ushered in a rigorous discrimination 
test relying on the notion that, in gauging the degree of substitutability between 
products, actual consumers’ preferences in the market place may be misleading.4 
Furthermore, its emphasis on the contingent nature of consumers’ habits and, 
notably, a hint to the effects of long-established protectionist practices on their 
configuration, heralded what would be the decisive finding for that hard dispute.5 In 
                                                        
1 Case C-170/78, Commission v United Kingdom [1980] ECR 417. 
2 Ibidem, paragraph 14.  
3 Ibidem, paragraph 13. 
4 H. Horn and J. H. H. Weiler, ‘European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products’ (2004) World Trade Review, 129, at 134-135, discussing latent 
demand and potential competition of products in the WTO. 
5 Case C-170/78, Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 2265. 




concluding on the discriminatory nature of the British tax system, the Court indeed 
noted that: 
[…] the effect of the United Kingdom tax system is to stamp wine with 
the hallmarks of a luxury product which, in view of the tax burden 
which it bears, can scarcely constitute in the eyes of the consumer a 
genuine alternative to the typical domestically produced beverage.6 
It was not just sophisticated adjudication. Unwittingly, the Court of Justice also 
offered a fine sample of social theory. In his account of how it is that government 
aligns with the nature of those governed, Nikolas Rose claims that policies and 
institutional arrangements do not simply reflect individuals’ preferences as if the 
latter were a given variable.7 The interaction between government and those subject 
to its rule is a much more complex matter in that it also involves a different and 
opposite dynamic: individuals are acted upon by government and thus it is their 
preferences which are also shaped by government’s aspirations and projects.8 Put 
differently, besides being recognised in our autonomy and desires, we are also 
targets of regulatory strategies that exert defining pressures on us.9 Therefore, 
according to this process – with Rose, we may call it ‘subjectification’10 – the 
alignment between government and governed ensues from a more circular course of 
action relying on both the recognition of individuals’ nature and its shaping by 
government operation. 
The ruling on the British taxation of alcoholic beverages substantiates legal 
subjectification quite nicely. In the Court’s view, the seemingly consolidated 
                                                        
6 Ibidem, paragraph 27. 
7 N. Rose, Inventing Our Selves – Psychology, Power and Personhood (CUP, 1996), at 119. 
8 Ibidem, at 121. It must be stressed that in Rose’s view this process works through rather than 
against subjectivity. In his words (at 122): ‘Liberal democracies increasingly depend on these 
indirect mechanisms through which the conducts, desires, and decisions of independent 
organizations and citizens may be aligned with the aspirations and objectives of government not 
through the imposition of politically determined standards, but through free choice and rational 
persuasion. Psychological theories, experts, languages, and calculations have had a key role here, 
providing the technologies to form these alliances between citizens and their rulers, persuading, 
convincing, shaping the private decisions of family members, managers, owners, and 
entrepreneurs so that they come into alignment with public goals such as increasing profitability, 
efficiency, health and adjustment’. 
9 Ibidem, at 152. 
10 Ibidem, at 171, clarifying that ‘subjectification is thus the name one can give to the effects of the 
composition and recomposition of forces, practices, and relations that strive or operate to render 
human being into diverse subject forms, capable of taking themselves as the subjects of their own 
and others practices upon them’. 
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preference of British consumers for beer over light wine11 had been shaped by 
longstanding protectionist policies. Even more interestingly, the same ruling 
betrayed also the Court’s own policy aspirations and their defining potential over 
individuals’ preferences. This was more explicitly acknowledged a few years later in 
a similar case concerning the regulatory regime of beer in Germany.12  The Court, 
prior to referring to its earlier judgment on light wine and beer, completed its 
doctrinal exposition by holding that 
[…] consumers’ conceptions which vary from one Member State to the 
other are also likely to evolve in the course of time within a Member 
State. The establishment of the Common Market is, it should be added, 
one of the factors that may play a major contributory role in that 
development […].13 
Cumulatively taken, therefore, those rulings demonstrate how consumers’ 
subjectification in Europe is a complex and controversial phenomenon. It is complex 
because individuals, situated within a pluralist system of government, are 
simultaneously exposed to multiple strategies of regulation. It is controversial 
because those strategies respond to distinct and not necessarily coordinated policy 
goals and rationales. As a consequence, consumers’ subjectification may be regarded 
as the resultant of a number of vectors responding to as many legal regimes, with 
their distinct foundations, concerns and regulatory ideals of the self. 
This article explores the legal subjectification of European consumers14 by rehearsing 
the Pasta and Hormones disputes. Drawing from those sources, it illustrates how 
individuals qua consumers are affected by distinct regulatory projects associated 
with domestic, EU and WTO legal systems. Situated at this intersection, individuals 
are recognised, stimulated and acted upon from varying vantage points, with each 
frame capturing (and shaping) specific aspects of the experience of consuming. On 
                                                        
11 After the adjustment of the tax rates for beer and wine, the increasing consumption of wine 
suggested that previously British consumers had probably been deterred by discriminatory 
taxation, S. Weatherill and P. Beaumont, EU Law (Penguin, 1999), at 482. 
12 Case C-178/84, Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227. 
13 Ibidem, paragraph 32. 
14 A similar effort to investigate the complexity of the legal encounters between law and 
consumption is undertaken in M. Everson and C. Joerges, ‘Consumer citizenship in post-national 
constellations?’, in K. Soper and F. Trentmann (eds), Citizenship and Consumption (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), at 154. 




the whole, the consumer emerges as a fractured subject, a bundle of partial identities, 
each deserving critical consideration and all requiring some degree of mutual 
adjustment. In a way, this yields an unexpected result: by fragmenting subjectivity, 
European legal pluralism offers a rather realistic representation of the contemporary 
human condition15 and, hence, is quite successful in aligning government with the 
nature of those governed.  
If this is true, there may be important legal implications for consumer protection 
across Europe. Conceived within a similar framework, market regulation and 
adjudication appear to be largely about the management and assemblage of 
competing identities, a task requiring both courts and policy-makers to 
accommodate them by devising synergies between their underlying regulatory 
projects. For this to happen, the way in which consumer protection is currently 
carried out must probably undergo some reconsideration as neither adjudication nor 
policy-making seem sufficiently intent on grasping the good inherent in European 
legal pluralism. As Pasta and Hormones show, courts do not conceive adjudication as 
a transnational coordinated effort. Disputes travel from court to court giving rise to 
judgments that most of the time are framed in a dimension essentially internal to 
their relevant legal systems. Engagement with the arguments proffered in previous 
rulings by courts belonging to other legal orders is seldom sought, with the overall 
result that each court enforces its particular conception of the consumer, neglects 
alternative identities and overlooks the possibility of synergies.  
To cope with this shortcoming, this article advocates the notion that European courts, 
alongside nurturing their specific perspectives on a dispute, act as components of a 
broader transnational interpretive community. In such a capacity, they would be 
requested to establish a degree of external coherence between the arguments put 
forward in their rulings and develop a shared understanding of the mechanics 
underlying European legal pluralism based on the notion of functional 
complementarity of its component parts. After showing the practical implications 
that such an adjudicative strategy would have had in the Pasta and Hormones 
                                                        
15 Rose, cit. at nt 7, at 169. 
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litigation, the article concludes by claiming that a similar conceptual framework for 
the relationships between consumers’ identities and the European legal regimes of 
subjectification may improve the transparency and contestability of adjudication and 
policy-making. Ultimately, it is suggested that the fractured European consumer 
may be constantly assembled in particular legal contexts as a contingently coherent, 
though highly problematic, legal entity. 
 
Consumers’ subjectification across Europe’s legal 
frameworks: an excursus on Pasta and Hormones 
Consumer protection inspires significant branches of EU16 and states’ law.17 Though 
indirectly, it is also of some concern for the law of the WTO.18 In market regulation 
across these legal systems consumers do not always play leading roles, the standing 
of governments and producers being quite often more prominent. Nonetheless, even 
if not directly or explicitly addressed, they are however touched upon by the 
trajectories of policy-making and adjudication. As such, they are the object of distinct 
assumptions and defining pressures as to their role and identity. The competition 
between regulatory strategies, therefore, is not simply about different allocations of 
regulatory resources between producers and consumers or conflicting categories of 
consumers. Perhaps more radically, regulatory strategies may be viewed as 
enhancing or contrasting rival identities coexisting in the same consumer and 
struggling for the hegemony. The Pasta and Hormones litigation provides ample 
illustration of this reality. 
 
                                                        
16 Articles 169 and 12 TFEU, and Article 38 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. For a 
general and comparative account on the evolution of consumer protection in the EU, see L. 
Antoniolli, ‘Consumer law as an instance of the law of diversity’ (2006) 30 Vermont Law Review, 
855. 
17 A variety of domestic approaches to consumer law is described in J. Stuyck, ‘European 
consumer law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: consumer policy in or beyond the internal market?’ 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review, 367, at 368-377. 
18 Notably, although not exclusively, the TBT and SPS Agreements. 




The consumer as citizen and infantilisation 
In Italy, national pride and gastronomic integrity appeared threatened when the 
Court of Justice set out to review under article 34 TFEU (then, 30 EEC) the domestic 
legislation19 on the composition requirements of pasta.20 Before being reviewed by 
the Court of Justice, the Italian legislation on pasta had already appeared on a few 
occasions before the Italian Constitutional Court. In a first case, the constitutionality 
of the prohibition on making pasta from ingredients other than durum wheat had 
been tested in Bottiglieri and Caruso.21 In that case, Bottiglieri and Caruso had been 
prosecuted for having illegally produced and sold pasta containing rye. The ordinary 
judge argued that that ban might violate article 41 of the Italian Constitution, the 
constitutional provision protecting the freedom of enterprise.22 In its view, not only 
did the prohibition hardly match the explicit limits to that freedom as defined in the 
Constitution, but it also appeared unreasonable with regard to the dietetic properties 
of rye. Legislation, it was observed, should have encouraged rather than banned the 
production of that cereal. Hence, the court decided to refer a question to the 
Constitutional Court. The latter replied with a rather terse ruling that, however, 
contains several interesting elements.  
Firstly, EU regulatory principles are completely neglected. At that time, for an Italian 
ordinary court faced with a conflict between domestic and Community law it was 
definitely appropriate to refer the case to the Constitutional Court.23 Yet, neither the 
ordinary nor the Constitutional court envisaged the potential common market 
implications of the dispute which was exclusively decided under article 41. 
                                                        
19 Law 4 July 1967, n. 580, Disciplina per la lavorazione e commercio dei cereali, degli sfarinati, 
del pane e delle paste alimentari, in Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 189, 29 July 1967. 
20 For a passionate defence of the Italian legislation, see the Opinion of AG Mancini in Case C-
407/85, Drei Glocken and Kritzinger and Case C-90/86, Zoni [1988] ECR I-4233. 
21 Corte cost., sent. 137/1971, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1971, 1577. 
22 Article 41 reads as follows: ‘Private economic enterprise is free. It may not be carried out 
against the common good or in such a manner that could damage safety, liberty and human 
dignity. The law shall provide for appropriate programmes and controls so that public and 
private-sector economic activity may be oriented and co-ordinated for social purposes’. 
23 The case was decided before Simmenthal and Granital, its domestic equivalent. In that period, 
conflicts between Community law and subsequent domestic legislation could only be adjudicated 
by the Constitutional Court (sent. 232/1975, ICIC, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1975, 2211). 
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Secondly, the Italian Constitutional Court construed article 41 as mandating a rather 
relaxed standard of review. In keeping with its precedents,24 the Court restated that 
judicial review under this constitutional provision requires a two-step scrutiny on 
the reasonableness of legislation. Accordingly, the legitimacy of its policy objectives 
must first be assessed. Next, ‘the generic suitability of the means’25 predisposed in 
the legislation for the pursuit of those goals must be tested. In the case at hand, the 
Constitutional Court found that the legislative measure aimed at legitimate 
objectives such as ‘the increase of grain production, through the protection of the 
specialised cereal cultivations, particularly notable in Southern Italy’, and the 
‘protection of the consumers and their health’. Then, the Court paid lip service to 
suitability review. Indeed, its scrutiny did not go as far as to test whether the 
prohibition of pasta containing rye could actually contribute to an increase of grain 
production or the protection of consumers. The Court was just content with the fact, 
documented in the text of the norms and the travaux préparatoires, that the legislative 
norms had apparently been designed for those ends. The question, therefore, was 
dismissed. Yet, in concluding, the Court offered an exquisite passage on consumer 
protection which is revealing of the spirit of the time. Confronted with the argument 
on the dietetic properties of rye and its possible use in the cure of diseases such as 
obesity, the Constitutional Court maintained that its ban could also be justified on 
health-protection grounds. As a rule, legislation ought to ‘afford consumers the 
highest and not the lowest nutritional value for the same price’, and only in 
exceptional cases could legislation authorise the production of dietetic pastas. Put 
differently, not only did the Court spare a protectionist industrial policy from strict 
judicial review, but it also endorsed a paternalistic model of consumer protection 
whereby individuals must normally be afforded more nutritional value than freedom 
of choice. 
                                                        
24 See, e.g., sent. 50/1957, Nonna and others, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1957, 621, and 
sent. 97/1969, Segalini, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1969, 1239. 
25 In the absence of an official translation of these judgments, the translation of this and other 
passages is my own. 




Constitutional litigation on pasta arose a few years later in Moja,26 a case in which the 
Constitutional Court proved its tremendous generosity. The dispute this time 
revolved around the production of pasta made from wholemeal flour. Again, 
possibly due to the purely internal nature of the dispute, the ordinary court framed 
its questions exclusively with regard to article 41, neglecting any EU law argument 
as well as the possibility of engaging with the Court of Justice through preliminary 
ruling. In its questions to the Constitutional Court, the ordinary judge suggested the 
overruling of Bottiglieri and Caruso with rather compelling arguments.27 Firstly, it 
questioned the coherence of the legislation at issue. It noted that whereas both 
wholemeal and durum pasta are made from durum wheat, only the former was 
banned – a choice that was difficult to justify if the goal of legislation was the 
protection and promotion of durum wheat production. Moreover, the measure could 
be challenged from a different angle, namely on the grounds of consistency. If the 
legislation allowed trade of wholemeal bread, on what grounds could it ban trade in 
wholemeal pasta? 
Those arguments received further support from enquiries ordered by the 
Constitutional Court itself that corroborated the suspects on the protectionist nature 
of legislation as well as the doubts on its actual contribution to the protection of 
human health.28 As a consequence, even if the Constitutional Court did not want to 
explicitly sanction protectionism, the legislative prohibition of wholemeal pasta 
could be found to be unreasonable or unnecessary on several grounds. Nevertheless, 
also in this case the Constitutional Court opted for a cautious approach. In its 
judgement, it conceded that the elements emerging from the proceedings had 
                                                        
26 Corte cost., sent. 20/1980, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1980, 171. 
27 Ibidem, paragraph 1. 
28 Ibidem, paragraphs 2-3. The ruling reports that the Ministry of Health recognised that the 
prohibition was hardly justifiable on health-protection grounds. On the contrary, it declared that, 
according to the most modern scientific evidence, trade of wholemeal pasta was desirable. It is 
also documented that the Ministry of Agriculture upheld the legislation by candidly advocating its 
underlying protectionist objectives. Notably, favour of durum pasta could be explained in light of 
the higher consumption of durum wheat associated with its production. Finally, figures from the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Italian National Institute of Statistics offered data to evaluate 
the market of durum wheat and its alleged need for protection. The enquiry revealed that not 
only did the internal production of pasta absorb all the domestic supply of durum wheat, but also 
that conspicuous amounts of that staple were actually imported. As a consequence, a decreased 
consumption of durum pasta in favour of wholemeal pasta would probably have resulted in 
reduced imports rather than in a decline of national productions. 
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undermined the arguments underpinning Bottiglieri and Caruso. However, it 
transparently admitted that political discretion in economic legislation was beyond 
its purview and that it was for the Parliament to reconsider the measure at issue. As 
a result, it ended up accepting as legitimate the legislative objectives and certifying 
with a shallow reasoning the generic suitability of the means.29  
On the whole, therefore, article 41 and the standard of review applied by the 
Constitutional Court seem to perform rather poorly in constraining economic 
legislation. That provision establishes a constitutive principle30 defining in open-
ended terms the relationship between economic freedom and its limits. Against this 
background, legislation is subject to proportionality review which the Italian 
Constitutional Court carries out through a ‘rationality test’, the most deferential of 
the standards of review.31 This leaves unaffected ostensibly protectionist objectives 
such as the defence of cereal cultivations of Southern Italy, and uncontested the 
means for their pursuit for their generic suitability. Far from being peculiar to the 
Italian Constitutional Court, a similar style of adjudication is common also to many 
of its equivalents operating in other European constitutional democracies.32 Within 
national constitutional contexts, indeed, existing distributions of economic resources 
are not entitled to any special protection from majoritarian decision-making.33 
Constitutional courts are marginal players, their role being confined to the safeguard 
of economic freedom only from the most egregious violations perpetrated by 
legislation. And sometimes, not from them either. 
In a similar context, the role of consumers seems residual and mostly decorative. 
Bottiglieri and Caruso and Moja are cases addressing the limits posed by national 
protectionist measures on the economic interests of certain pasta manufacturers. The 
side-effects of those policies on consumers are mostly disregarded as repeatedly 
                                                        
29 Ibidem, paragraph 4. 
30 On the notions of constitutive and regulatory principles (see below in the text), see D. J. Gerber, 
Law and Comeptition in Twentieth Century Europe – Protecting Prometheus (Clarendon Press, 
1998), at 248-249. 
31 C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard University Press, 1993) at 29. 
32 T. Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions (CUP, 2003), at 249-250. 
33 This appears also the view espoused by the German Constitutional Court since its seminal 
judgment BVerfGE 4, 7 (1954) Investment Aid case. 




demonstrated by the scarce enthusiasm of the Constitutional Court for the 
arguments concerning the dietetic properties of rye and wholemeal pasta. Such 
attitude is probably not accidental but, on the contrary, it exhibits a distinctive trait 
of national regulatory strategies. In national quarters, the individual is mainly 
assumed as a citizen, whereas its consumer profile remains subsidiary. The political 
identity of the individual overshadows its economic role – an aspect reflected at an 
institutional level by the privileged status recognised in constitutional adjudication 
to parliamentary deliberations over economic freedoms. In this framework, both 
production and consumption are regarded as activities in the service of the society. 
As such, they are exposed to the possible biases and detrimental effects of democratic 
decision-making,34 without any meaningful assistance from constitutional norms and 
judicial review of legislation. This seems the price to be paid for citizens’ voice and 
constitutional settings that praise parliaments and representative democracy as the 
main venues for working out economic and social conflicts. The risk of protectionism 
and the infantilisation of consumers are the inconvenient flipsides of those legal 
regimes, of which the passage on the nutritional value of durum pasta in Bottiglieri 
and Caruso is probably the most eloquent illustration.35 
 
The rational consumer and vulnerability 
It is at this juncture that the EU principles of free movement and the European Court 
of Justice appear on the scene. In Zoni,36 an Italian wholesaler imported from 
Germany dry pasta made from a mixture of common wheat and durum wheat. Such 
trade also contravened domestic legislation but, unlike in earlier disputes, the case 
had a clear and actual cross-border dimension which allowed the invocation of the 
free movement principles. The ordinary court referred the case to the Court of Justice 
                                                        
34 M. Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, in J. Shaw and G. More (eds), The New Legal 
Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995), 73, at 87-88. 
35 For the totally opposite approach of the Court of Justice on the issue of nutritional value, see 
Case C-216/84, Commission v France (Milk substitutes) [1988] ECR 793 and Case C-274/87, 
Commission v Germany (Nutritional value of meat) [1989] ECR 229. 
36 Case C-90/86, Criminal Proceeding against Giorgio Zoni [1988] ECR I-4285. See also Case C-
407/85, Drei Glocken GmbH and Gertraud Kritzinger v USL Centro-Sud and Provincia autonoma di 
Bolzano [1988] ECR I-4233. 
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requesting a tailor-made interpretation of article 34 TFEU. The latter judgment 
reframes the whole issue of pasta regulation through the common market vocabulary 
and, by doing so, it gives the following relationship with the Italian Constitutional 
Court a radical twist. In the EU lexicon, indeed, the Italian legislation on pasta clearly 
amounts to a measure regulating product requirements. The Court of Justice deals 
routinely with this kind of measures, so much so that it has gradually gained 
institutional expertise in the field.37 To a large extent, Zoni conforms to that 
consolidated line of case law.  
In the first part of the judgment,38 the Court found that the measure at issue hindered 
access to the Italian market to foreign products not complying with the host state 
legislation. As such, it qualified it as a measure equivalent to a quantitative 
restriction prohibited by article 34. Already at this stage, therefore, a stark contrast 
with the national style of constitutional adjudication can be noted. In the application 
of common market principles, there are no traces of the deference towards political 
decision-making so influential in the arguments and solutions adopted by the 
Constitutional Court. Unlike its national counterpart, the Court of Justice does not 
shy away, since in the common market framework obstacles to trade flows are 
normally regarded with suspicion regardless of their political goals. 
After finding the Italian measure prima facie illegal, the Court of Justice examined its 
possible policy justifications. In this respect, a human health exception had been 
claimed by the Italian Government. The latter had stated that pasta made from 
common wheat contained chemical additives or colorants which could be harmful to 
human health. Yet, such an assertion had not been adequately documented and, 
therefore, was rapidly dismissed.39  
Nor was the goal of ensuring a higher quality of pasta accepted. A number of 
objections could be submitted in this regard: is the quality of pasta made from 
durum wheat really higher than that made from common wheat? In Italy that might 
                                                        
37 The leading case is Case C-120/78, Rewe Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fuer 
Branntwein [1979] ECR I-649. 
38 Zoni, paragraphs 9-11. 
39 Ibidem, paragraphs 12-14. 




go uncontested, since pasta made solely from durum wheat cooks much better. 
Nonetheless, during the case it was revealed that, for instance, in Nordic countries 
pasta made from common wheat is preferred. Moreover, one could also ask whether 
it was appropriate for the state to channel consumers’ choices towards products 
supposedly of a higher quality.40 In its judgment the Court of Justice did not answer 
all these questions directly. Yet, its ruling conveys a notion of consumer protection 
diametrically opposed to that encountered on a national level. In accordance with its 
precedents, the Court conceded that it could be legitimate for a state to grant 
consumers high-quality products and, in the case at stake, pasta made exclusively 
from durum wheat. Nevertheless, that objective, noted the Court, did not necessarily 
require an outright ban on imports. There were instruments with a lesser impact on 
intra-Community trade such as labels which could instruct consumers as to the 
quality of products and, on that basis, help them make their own choices. As a result, 
the national measure, although aiming at a legitimate goal, infringed the principle of 
proportionality and could not be justified.41  
Even with regard to proportionality, therefore, the Court of Justice adopts a stricter 
standard of review than its national colleague. On human health, the Court requires 
scientific evidence for measures purporting to prevent health risks. On consumer 
protection, it ends up second-guessing and redefining the policy choices inherent in 
the pasta legislation. Under the rule of article 34, the Court of Justice questions the 
paternalist approach to consumer protection inspiring Italian legislation and 
activates the consumers’ ability to choose between a wider range of products with 
different ingredients and prices. The cost of this solution is a direct interference with 
national regulatory autonomy and greater exposure to charges of judicial activism. 
Yet, even in this regard, the ruling of the Court of Justice contains important nuances. 
In the final part of its judgment, the Court devotes a few passages to the industrial 
policy objectives so benevolently validated by the Italian Constitutional Court.42 The 
Italian Government had argued that the repeal of the domestic legislation would also 
                                                        
40 In support of a more active role of EU institutions in this regard, see C. MacMaoláin, EU food 
law – Protecting consumers and health in a common market (Hart Publishing, 2007), Ch. 6. 
41 Zoni, paragraphs 15-18. 
42 Ibidem, paragraphs 23-25. 
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cause domestic producers to use the cheapest common wheat for pasta intended for 
the Italian market. A similar outcome would also have a negative impact on 
consumers of durum wheat pasta, suddenly deprived of their favourite product. 
Quite surprisingly, on this specific point the Court of Justice avoided a 
confrontational approach and, namely, it did not repeat its steadfast opposition to 
the invocation of economic objectives as grounds for derogation of market regulatory 
principles.43 In replying to those arguments, it observed that the contrast between 
article 34 and national legislation did not necessarily entail the repeal or annulment 
of the latter. The effect of its ruling was to impede the application of that measure to 
imports, leaving unaffected the right of national authorities to regulate restrictively 
the domestic production of pasta and pursue industrial policy objectives in that 
sphere.  
Whereas voice and political participation were the defining features of the ‘consumer 
as citizen’ encountered at a domestic level, freedom of choice and information are the 
main traits of the ‘rational consumer’, its counterpart promoted at a supranational 
level.44 In Zoni, the rational consumer emerges as the indirect beneficiary of the 
common market project.45 Its ideological significance could not be overestimated: as 
in the 18th Century the notion of homo economicus enabled the emancipation from the 
feudal economic and legal order, in the common market project the notion of a 
rational consumer embodies the individual freed from state protectionism, 
paternalism and other dysfunctions associated with the deterioration of 
representative democracy or uncoordinated national policy-making. In view of its 
purposes of economic integration, the common market postulates an informed, self-
reliant and circumspect agent who can confidently exercise his freedom of choice 
                                                        
43 See, e.g., Case C-7/61, Commission v Italy (Italian pigmeat) [1961] ECR 317 and Case C-254/98, 
Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb v TK-Heimdienst Sass GmbH [2000] ECR I-151. 
44 See, e.g., Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln e.V. v Mars GmbH 
[1995] ECR I-1923, paragraph 24, referring to a ‘reasonably circumspect consumer’, and Case C-
465/98, Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV v Adolf Darbo Ag [2000] ECR I-
2297, paragraph 20, referring to an ‘average consumer who is reasonably well informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect’. 
45 S. Weatherill, ‘The Evolution of European Consumer Law and Policy: From Well Informed 
Consumer to Confident Consumer?’, in H. W. Micklitz (ed), Rechtseinheit oder Rechtvielfalt in 
Europa? (Nomos, 1996), 424, at 429. 




between goods and services that he can apparently afford.46 The market place is his 
favourite habitat, whereas his relationships with political institutions and policy-
making are largely instrumental.47 Indeed, the world of the rational consumer is a 
world of mobility and competition where political involvement and solidarity are 
only secondary dimensions.  
Enhancing the rational consumer implies tackling the biases of national policy-
making, a strategy that lies at the core of the common market project and is clearly 
reflected in the framing of supranational disputes.48 In cases such as Zoni, for 
instance, litigation is structured as a challenge to the political autonomy of the 
member states. National measures are viewed from the standpoint of regulatory 
principles such as articles 34-36 TFEU, establishing default prohibitions on measures 
hindering access to market mitigated by principled derogations for policy objectives. 
In this framework, member states are expected to rebut a prima facie finding of 
illegality of their measures by showing that they are genuinely committed to the 
pursuit of legitimate policy objectives. Justification, then, brings in proportionality 
review, a task that the Court of Justice undertakes in the light of far stricter standards 
than the rationality test. As witnessed by the passage on health protection in Zoni, 
the Court first tests the legitimacy of states’ policy objectives as well as their effective 
and coherent pursuit. Next, national measures may undergo more demanding 
scrutiny. In Zoni, for instance, pasta legislation is reviewed with a ‘pure balance’ test 
under which the level of protection of non-economic objectives is second-guessed 
and, ultimately, questioned.49 
Obviously, even a project tailored to the rational consumer reveals a number of 
critical points. Investing in individuals’ rationality and ability to process information 
may be sound policy, particularly if the purpose is tackling market fragmentations 
                                                        
46 Everson, cit. at nt 34, at 87. 
47 Ibidem, at 85-86. 
48 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the 
Evolution of Free Movement of Goods’, in P. Craig, G. de Burca (eds), The Evolution of the EU (OUP, 
1999), 349, at 362-363. 
49 On the distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘equivalence’ (see below in the text) balance tests, see M. 
Poiares Maduro, We, the Court – The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution (Hart Publishing, 1998), at 56-57. 
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and building a common market. Yet, that may turn out also to be a strategy that 
underestimates vulnerability and places high demands on actual consumers.50 
Indeed, besides constraining states’ regulatory autonomy, an aggressive enforcement 
of free movement principles is often conducive to a redistribution of regulatory 
resources from vulnerable to circumspect individuals.51 Pro-choice regulatory 
strategies not only put a premium on rationality, caution and cunning but, critically, 
reward information, culture and purchase power. As such, they may be a recipe for 
regressive policy outcomes.  
The redistributive side-effects of free movement are but one of the critical 
implications of the rational consumer. In fact, the weakest segments of society are not 
the only potential losers of regulatory strategies relying on choice. This appears 
overtly when considering that consumers’ preferences are only in part a product of 
rational deliberation. Other variables such as time constraints, emotional and 
accidental elements may impinge upon them and exert an often crucial influence on 
their definition. From this perspective, vulnerability emerges as an endemic feature 
of modern societies. Virtually all individuals in a certain moment of the day, a certain 
period of their lives or in particular contexts or relationships may be vulnerable and, 
as such, seek protection from the inconveniences attached to choice. However, cases 
such as Zoni and, more in general, a considerable part of EU law appear to 
underestimate these aspects.52 On an ideological level, the appeal of the rational 
consumer or, more appropriately, its underlying promise of autonomy, success and 
prosperity seem irresistible, so much so that it has gone into making up the default 
approach to consumption in EU law.53  
It is at this point that a further, less evident but probably more problematic element 
of this regime of subjectification emerges. As noted, in promoting the rational 
consumer, the common market project presents itself as investing a great deal on 
                                                        
50 G. Howells and T. Wilhelmsonn, ‘EC consumer law: has it come of age?’ (2003) European Law 
Review, 370, at 380-381. 
51 Weatherill, cit. at nt 45, at 429. 
52 MacMaoláin, cit. at nt 40, at 223. 
53 D. Chalmers, ‘Gauging the Cumbersomeness of EU Law’ (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems, 405, 
at 410. 




individual choice.54 Paradoxically, though, to be a rational consumer does not seem 
entirely a matter of choice. More accurately, the option of evading that role is not 
without economic and social costs, especially if that identity has implicitly gained the 
status of mainstream social paradigm. In this view, the promise of emancipation and 
more opportunities associated with the common market project sounds more 
ambiguous.55 Whereas on the one hand the rational consumer succeeds in reforming 
the infantilised consumer-citizen, on the other it constantly confronts individuals 
with the stress of choice: comparing offers, avoiding cheating and, more in general, 
responding to the apparently self-imposed expectation of behaving if not like a good 
consumer, at least as an average one.56 This may result in anxiety, chronic uncertainty 
and, predictably, increasing demands for legal protection. 
 
The transformative capacity of the rational consumer 
It was noted in the previous subsection that the Court of Justice, by confining its 
rulings to cross-border trade, scales down their impact on states’ regulatory 
autonomy and preserves a degree of regulatory diversity on a national level.57 Yet, 
this adjudicative strategy also brings in reverse discriminations which, besides 
benefiting consumers and relieving the pressure on national governments, may 
provoke less enthusiastic reactions by the social groups discriminated against. 
Domestic producers of pasta, for instance, may decide to relocate their business to 
other member states. Once there, not only can they profit from a more favourable 
regulatory framework, but they are also in the position of penetrating their originally 
foreclosed national markets. Other economic players may opt for alternative 
strategies. Rather than migrating, they can try to voice their interests in their 
domestic constituency by either lobbying the political circuit or challenging reverse 
                                                        
54 In this enabling aspect, the common market project embodies the notion of ‘advanced 
liberalism’ discussed in N. Rose, Powers of freedom (CUP, 1999), at 141-142. 
55 Chalmers, cit. at nt 53, at 437. 
56 Rose, cit. at nt 7, at 160, speaking of an ‘… autonomous, responsible subject, obliged to make its 
life meaningful through acts of choice’ (Italics added).  
57 C. Barnard and S. Deakin, ‘Market Access and regulatory Competition’, in C. Barnard and J. Scott 
(eds), The Law of the Single European Market (Hart Publishing, 2002), 197, at 203. 
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discriminations before national courts.58 The latter circumstance occurred in Italy a 
decade after Zoni had been decided. 
The last chapter of the Pasta saga, in fact, takes place where it started, a purely 
internal situation. In Pepi and Catto,59 an ordinary court was requested to enforce the 
prohibition on making pasta from ingredients other than durum wheat against 
domestic manufacturers who had produced pastas containing garlic, parsley and 
squid ink. The judge, considering the more liberal regulatory regime applying to 
foreign pastas, decided to refer a question to the Constitutional Court asking 
whether the different treatment of domestic and imported products was reasonable. 
Influenced by the ruling in Zoni, the Constitutional Court reversed its earlier views 
on pasta legislation. 
Already from the outset, the reasoning shows that after Zoni the atmosphere in 
national quarters had changed. The Constitutional Court conceded that the goals 
pursued by national legislation and validated in its earlier judgments were difficult 
to accommodate with EU law.60 Next, it addressed the core of the case and stressed 
how the outcome of Zoni undermined the competitive position of domestic pasta 
manufacturers. At this point, the Constitutional Court observed that, according to 
EU free movement principles, national legislation could still govern purely internal 
situations. As recognised also by the Court of Justice, in purely internal situations 
member states were entitled to pursue their industrial policy objectives and, 
therefore, maintain reverse discriminations.61 Yet, in this dimension, the legislative 
remained constrained by the domestic constitutional principles such as equal 
treatment and the freedom of enterprise.62 In this respect, the Constitutional Court 
noted that, however immaterial for EU purposes, the disparity in the treatment of 
domestic and foreign economic producers mattered for domestic ones. It found that, 
                                                        
58 On EU regulatory competition and its practical difficulties, see J-M. Sun and J. Pelkmans, 
‘Regulatory Competition in the Single Market’ (1995) 33 Journal of Common Market Studies, 67, at 
72-82. 
59 Corte cost., sent. 443/1997, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1997, 3904. 
60 Ibidem, paragraph 4. 
61 See, e.g., Case C-237/82, Jongeneel Kaas BV and others v State of the Netherlands and Stichting 
Centraal Orgaan Zuivelcontrole [1984] ECR 483. 
62 Pepi and Catto, paragraph 5. 




in the absence of other constitutionally based justifications, the legislative had no 
choice but to extend to domestic producers the more favourable treatment applying 
to their foreign competitors.63 As a result, pasta legislation was outlawed for the 
breach of domestic constitutional norms. 
The turnabout of the Constitutional Court is remarkable. Also in purely internal 
situations, protectionism and paternalism are replaced by market orthodoxy and 
freedom of choice. At a closer look, nevertheless, common market principles do not 
trump national law. Rather, those norms are used to recast the interpretation of 
constitutional principles in purely internal situations and adapt it to the transnational 
process of economic integration.64 The change in domestic constitutional 
adjudication, in fact, amounts to neither an explicit overruling of its earlier case law 
on article 41 nor to a substitution of national constitutional principles with EU ones. 
The trajectory followed by the Constitutional Court is more sophisticated. Its new 
assessment of pasta legislation consists of a quite conventional application of the 
principle of equal treatment. What has considerably changed from its prior 
judgments is the legal context. By removing the obstacles to the import of pasta made 
from ingredients other than durum wheat, the Court of Justice has opened the 
national jurisdiction to a broader scenario including the economic interests of 
outsiders previously overlooked by national legislation. The Constitutional Court 
did not find valid reasons to defend a legislation which from protective had become 
detrimental for domestic producers. As a result, it embraced the more liberal solution 




                                                        
63 Ibidem, paragraph 6. 
64 S. Weatherill, ‘Pre-emption, Harmonisation and the Distribution of Competence to Regulate the 
Internal Market’, in Barnard and Scott, cit. at nt 57, 41, at 67. 
65 However, it is noteworthy that subsequent legislation, besides incorporating a mutual 
recognition clause for imported pasta lawfully produced in other member states (art. 48(1), Law 
24 April 1998, n. 128), has reintroduced a degree of reverse discrimination by adopting distinct 
product requirements for pasta made in Italy and intended for the Italian market (Regulation 9 
February 2001, n. 187).  
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The confident consumer and anxiety 
Until now analysis has highlighted how common market principles as construed by 
the Court of Justice may contribute to the reconfiguration of the domestic approach 
to consumer protection. However, the transformative capacity of the rational 
consumer must not be confused with its uncontested primacy. In particular, 
European policymakers and courts have not turned a blind eye on vulnerability. 
There are cases in which the Court of Justice has acknowledged the weakness of 
specific categories of consumers and reinforced through ‘equivalence’ balance review 
national measures that genuinely assured their protection.66 Similarly, EU legislation 
provides remedies and guarantees vis-à-vis particularly aggressive forms of 
marketing and trading.67  
The EU, indeed, does not rely on the information paradigm only. Building a common 
market is a much broader effort than ensuring access to market or empowering 
rational individuals. It requires also that the latter actually engage in cross-border 
shopping, an objective that the EU encourages with policies directed at the ‘confident 
consumer’.68 Through these initiatives, the focus of the market project shifts 
gradually from producers to consumers, opening up a new regulatory scenario. 
Consumer protection is not just about increasing individuals’ freedom of choice, 
although it continues to build upon that notion. For consumers to become confident 
and actually exercise their freedom of choice, they also need to be reassured as to the 
reliability of the common market as a space for convenient and effective 
transactions.69 Moreover, their need for assurances extends well beyond economic 
risks and involves other potential threats to human health such as the spread of 
diseases or the use of dangerous substances. In addressing similar concerns, the EU 
embarks on political administration and the government of risk.70 In this respect, the 
                                                        
66 See, e.g. Case C-382/87, Buet v Ministère Public [1989] ECR 1235. 
67 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises, OJ L 372, 31.12.1985, 31–33. 
68 Weatherill, cit. at nt 45, at 461-464. 
69 N. Reich, ‘Economic law, consumer interests and EU integration’, in H-W. Micklitz, N. Reich and 
P. Rott (eds), Understanding EU Consumer Law (Intersentia, 2009), 1, at 16. 
70 D. Chalmers, ‘Risk, anxiety and the European mediation of politics of life’ (2005) European Law 
Review, 649, at 651. 




confident consumer also raises challenging questions. To what extent is the 
promotion of consumers’ confidence on the functioning of the common market 
worth pursuing over other rival values? To what extent should consumers be 
reassured as to real or virtual threats?  
The Hormones saga offers an emblematic representation of such quandaries. Since the 
1980s the European Community had taken up a rather sceptical approach to the use 
of hormones in livestock farming.71 Previously, member states’ views on the issue 
diverged and different regulatory regimes applied throughout Europe. In certain 
countries, the adoption of restrictive rules reflected consumers’ widespread distrust 
of the health effects of hormones. Other states enforced more liberal rules. Strongly 
pressured by consumer and environmental groups as well as by the first directly 
elected European Parliament, the Commission and the Council decided to regulate 
the matter by laying down a uniform legislation based on a high standard of health 
protection. Thus, despite the prevalent opinion of scientific experts that hormones, if 
properly administered, are safe, a limited72 and, later, wide-ranging73 ban on their use 
in livestock farming was eventually enacted. 
The newly introduced legal regime met with both external and internal opposition. 
Outside Europe the main opponent was the US, where hormones are widely used in 
the cattle sector. At the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission the US engaged 
with the EU in negotiations, but no agreement was reached. The dispute also 
appeared intractable at a GATT level, ending up in US retaliation against EU exports. 
Ultimately, an agreement on a partial lift of the ban on US ‘hormone-free’ beef was 
reached but, apart from that, the affair remained largely unresolved.  
Inside Europe, beef producers, importers and pharmaceutical companies mobilised 
against the ban and, at the end of that decade, made their way to the Court of 
                                                        
71 On the background of the beef-hormone dispute, see T. Josling, D. Roberts and A. Hassan, ‘The 
Beef-Hormone Dispute and its Implications for Trade Policy’, Stanford University, European 
forum WP, 1999, <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/11379/HORMrev.pdf> (last consulted 
December 2010), at 3-9. 
72 Council Directive 81/602/EEC concerning the prohibition of certain substances having a 
hormonal action and of any substances having a thyrostatic action, OJ L 222, 7.8.1981, 32-33. 
73 Council Directive 88/146/EEC, prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain substances 
having a hormonal action, OJ L 70, 16.3.1988, 16–18. 
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Justice.74 In Fedesa,75 the directive prohibiting hormones administration was 
challenged on several grounds but, for our purposes, two aspects are worth 
considering in particular.  
Firstly, the plaintiff argued that the directive lacked an adequate scientific basis. In 
this regard, the Court of Justice found that the measure at issue involved a complex 
economic and political situation.76 Accordingly, its judicial review ought only to 
examine ‘whether the measure in question [was] vitiated by a manifest error or 
misuse of powers, or whether the authority in question [had] manifestly exceeded 
the limits of its discretion’. On this point, the Court observed that science was 
inconclusive on the safety of hormones and that divergences in national legislations 
reflected that contentious debate. As a consequence, in regulating the use of 
hormones the Council enjoyed broad discretionary powers, which it had not 
manifestly exceeded. On the contrary, by adopting a general prohibition, the Council 
had responded to the concerns expressed in turn by the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and consumer organisations77 – a conclusion 
reaffirmed soon after when the Court noted that divergences in national legislations 
were such that one could not reasonably expect the EU directives to rely on scientific 
data alone.78 
A rather similar outcome was reached also by reviewing the proportionality of the 
EU measure. Here, the Court of Justice appeared to endorse a rather strict standard 
of adjudication including all the canonical steps of proportionality test. Yet, as a 
matter of fact, the Court applied a light-touch review.79 Confronted with the 
arguments of the plaintiff, the Court replied first of all that a complete ban on 
hormones was not manifestly inappropriate in regulating the beef market and, 
                                                        
74 Previous challenges had been dismissed due to applicants’ manifest lack of locus standi. See, 
e.g., Case 34/88, Coopérative agricole de l'Anjou et du Poitou (Cevap) and others v Council [1988] 
ECR 6265. 
75 Case C-331/88, The Queen v The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of 
State for Health ex parte: Fedesa and others [1990] ECR I-4023. 
76 For a survey on the complex web of interests involved in the regulation of hormones, see the 
Opinion of AG Mischo, paras 15-16. 
77 Fedesa, paragraphs 8-9. 
78 Ibidem, paragraph 10. 
79 Ibidem, paragraphs 13-14.  




actually, was easier and cheaper to supervise than a system of partial authorisation.80 
Then, it went on to observe that no less restrictive measures were available to achieve 
the same level of protection afforded by the directive at issue. Notably, it pointed out 
that dissemination of information to consumers and labelling of meat were not 
sufficient measures in allaying consumers’ anxieties.81 Finally, the Court of Justice 
affirmed that the protection of human health could justify the negative financial 
repercussions suffered by certain traders.82 
Overall, such an outcome may seem somewhat puzzling. Reshaped in the member 
states, at an EU level consumer protection unexpectedly reveals traits echoing some 
of the most out-of-date domestic sensibilities documented by cases like Moja. Faced 
with the political decisions of national governments and the European Parliament, 
the Court of Justice adheres to deferential standards of review.83 Accordingly, it 
reinforces legislative measures that, however supported by broad political 
consensus, probably overlooked scientists’ contributions. That leads to a quite 
startling conception of consumer protection. Relentlessly preached to national 
legislators, freedom of choice and its corollaries of labelling and information appear 
suddenly ill-suited measures to cope with the risks associated with the food market. 
The thing is that with the legislative ban the EU responds to concerns expressed by 
its consumers over the safety of hormones with a view to restoring their confidence 
in the meat market after a few episodes in which the administration of hormones had 
seemed the cause of severe diseases. Protectionism is not a meaningful issue in that 
dispute. Unlike pasta legislation, the EU measures did not amount to disguised 
barriers to trade protecting European beef producers.84 Rather, if anyone captures the 
regulator in Hormones, those are the ‘anxious consumers’,85 another of the identities 
                                                        
80 Ibidem, paragraph 15. 
81 Ibidem, paragraph 16. 
82 Ibidem, paragraph 17. 
83 J. Corkin, ‘Science, legitimacy and the law: regulating risk regulation judiciously in the 
European Community’ (2008) European Law Review, 359, at 363. 
84 This will be acknowledged by the WTO Appellate Body, see EC Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26 and WT/DS48/AB/R/CAN, 16 
January 1998, at paragraph 245. 
85 Josling and others, cit., at 34. 
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populating EU policymaking and adjudication.86 The judgment in Fedesa is probably 
the best example to account for this more obliging approach of EU law. In that ruling 
the Court of Justice upholds the EC ban on hormones regardless of its shaky 
scientific grounds. EU policy-making had been seized by consumers groups and 
their politics of fear does not find any serious constraint on the part of the Court of 
Justice. In its judgment, the information paradigm and labelling no longer appear as 
the panacea, and no objections are raised to the fact that anxious consumers end up 
being the only constituency represented in hormones legislation.  
Beyond the merit of that dispute, this attitude places risk regulation before a thorny 
dilemma. On the one hand, policy responses to marginal or hypothetical risks may 
back up and even amplify popular prejudice, providing further incentive to special 
interests to promote both the fear and the corresponding response.87 On the other, 
while the utility of EU directives in reducing the risks associated with the use of 
hormones may be disputed, the same cannot be said for their contribution to 
ensuring consumers’ psychological security, a public good that both markets and the 
government of risk cannot easily disvalue.88 
 
Between the technocratic paradigm and the judicious consumer 
Such dilemma will be of central relevance in the WTO segment of the Hormones 
litigation. With the entry into force of the Marrakech Agreement, the Hormones 
dispute resumed on an international level in the newly established WTO legal 
                                                        
86 There are clear similarities between the infantilised and anxious consumer in that both are 
patronised by public powers with a view to prevent real of virtual hazards associated with 
choice, and both could be reformed by regulatory strategies inspired to the rational consumer. 
Notwithstanding this analogy, a critical difference concerning their prevailing regulatory 
demands remains: whereas the infantilised consumer is likely to be interested in more choice 
and emancipation from regulatory constraints, the anxious one is more likely to request 
protection from the risks that choice could entail. 
87 H. F. Chang, ‘Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute: 
Nothing to fear But fear Itself?’ (2003) 77 South California Law Review, 743, at 774. 
88 R. Howse, ‘Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade 
Organization’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review, 2329, at 2350. Restoring consumers’ confidence 
has been recognised as legitimate policy objective also by the Court of First Instance in Case T-
13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002] ECR II-3305, paragraph 462. 




framework. In that context, two important reforms had been introduced since the 
earlier controversies under the GATT. Firstly, an Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) had been approved. Such a treaty spells out 
a set of regulatory principles on food safety accommodating states’ political 
autonomy with other objectives such as the protection of human health and free 
trade. Accordingly, WTO members retain their right to adopt sanitary measures but, 
in order to avert protectionism, they are expected to rely on science.89 Secondly, a 
reformed system of dispute settlement had been established with a view to 
improving the enforcement of WTO regulatory principles. Enticed by such 
innovations, the US and Canada reopened their hostilities against the EU ban on 
hormones.90 
In a first review undertaken by the Panel, the EU directives received a rather harsh 
treatment and were found to be in breach of several SPS provisions.91 At the outset, 
the Panel noted that the EU measures did not conform to the relevant technical 
standards contained in the recommendations of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission. Notably, significant discrepancies were found between the no residue 
level of hormones administered for growth purposes allowed in meat by the EU and 
the limited and unlimited levels of, respectively, synthetic and natural hormones 
permitted by international standards.92 Confronted with this discrepancy, the Panel 
stressed the need for the EU to justify the higher level of protection in its measures. 
In this respect, the directives were found to be lacking a sufficient scientific basis.93 In 
its review of risk assessment, the Panel held that the EU had not observed both the 
procedural and substantive requirements mandated by the SPS agreement. Scientific 
evidence had not been cited in the preambles of the directives where, conversely, the 
                                                        
89 Article 2 SPS. 
90 In the meantime, the EC ban had been confirmed and extended by Directive 96/22/EC, 
concerning the prohibition on the use in stock farming of certain substances having a hormonal 
or thyrostatic action and of ß-agonists, and repealing Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 
88/299/EEC, OJ L 125, 23.5.1996, 3-9.  
91 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Panel, 
WS/DS26R/USA, 18 August 1997. 
92 Ibidem, paragraphs 8.75-8.76. 
93 Ibidem, paragraphs 8.113-8.114 and 8.137. 
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opinions of the EU political bodies appeared undisputed.94 Then, contradictions were 
noted also between the outright prohibition of hormones and the more benign 
scientific studies submitted by the EU to the attention of the Panel.95 
On the top of that, the EU measures were also found to be illegal on consistency 
grounds. Article 5.5 SPS requires that WTO members adopting higher standards of 
health protection avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions between equivalent 
sources of risk which might result in disguised restrictions on international trade. In 
this regard, after a comparative assessment between the treatment of natural and 
synthetic hormones administered for growth promotion, natural hormones occurring 
endogenously in meat and other foods and growth promoters, the EU measures were 
declared inconsistent.96 The EU, as a result, was found to be in breach of its WTO/SPS 
obligations and was advised by the Panel to consider alternative and rather familiar 
instruments of consumer protection: ‘[…] we are aware that in some countries where 
the use of growth promoting hormones is permitted in beef production, voluntary 
labelling schemes operate whereby beef from animals which have not received such 
treatment may be so labelled’.97 
A negative appraisal of the EU ban on hormones emerged also from the scrutiny of 
the WTO Appellate Body.98 Admittedly, in the report of the latter several of the 
Panel’s findings on crucial aspects such as the allocation of the burden of proof, the 
role of international standards under the SPS agreement, the interpretation and 
methodology of risk assessment and consistency review were reversed. Nonetheless, 
the absence of an adequate scientific basis in the directives was confirmed.99 Indeed, 
the Appellate Body found that the EU had not carried out a complete risk assessment 
of the risks arising from the failure to observe good veterinary practices in the 
administration of hormones. As a result, the obliging attitude of the EU towards the 
anxieties of its consumers was again penalised. In that ruling, the role of scientists’ 
                                                        
94 Ibidem, paragraph 8.114. 
95 Ibidem, paragraphs 8.134 and 8.137. 
96 Ibidem, paragraphs 8.245 and 8.270. 
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98 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Appellate Body Report, cit. at nt 
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contributions in particular gained important support. The Appellate Body, in fact, 
recognised that science can be inconclusive. But differently from the Court of Justice 
in Fedesa, it found that experts’ disagreement cannot be an excuse for political 
institutions to bypass scientific opinions. To be sure, WTO members retain important 
margins of discretion but, in defining the desired level of protection and devising 
their regulatory measures, they are expected to take into account scientific opinions 
coming from qualified and respected sources.100 
Faced with measures enacted under the influence of consumers’ anxiety, the WTO 
reaction is a call for technocracy. Yet, if it may be conceded that populist responses to 
anxiety are flawed, neither do their technocratic alternatives seem entirely 
satisfactory. Anxious consumers are not prone to being easily converted into rational 
ones through information or regulatory solutions in which science ultimately trumps 
self-government. However, this is the strategy inspiring both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body reports.101 According to the former, political and social arguments 
may be taken into account at the stage of risk management, in setting the desired 
level of health protection.102 But once that is defined, regulatory autonomy calls for 
scientific validation, stemming from both the procedural and substantive 
requirements associated with risk assessment.  
Although rejecting such solution, the Appellate Body does not introduce a 
conceptual break with the Panel’s approach. True, in discussing risk assessment the 
Appellate Body concedes that science is inherently controversial and that, therefore, 
it is for political institutions to pick out among the available scientific studies the one 
that seems most convincing. But despite this significant specification of governments’ 
obligations, regulatory autonomy is not exempted from scientific support. Regulators 
may have regained important margins of political discretion but, in the end, they still 
                                                        
100 Ibidem, paragraph 194. 
101 Admittedly, one could note that had article 5.7 SPS on the precautionary principle be argued 
in the Hormones dispute, the WTO adjudicative outcome might have been remarkably different 
and upheld the EU measure. Yet, in a quite controversial passage the Appellate Body points out 
that in the SPS Agreement the precautionary principle has not been inserted to justify otherwise 
inconsistent measures and, notably, cannot override the provisions on risk assessment (Ibidem, 
paragraphs 124-125). 
102 EC Hormones, Panel Report, cit. at nt 91, paragraph 8.97. 
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require science to justify their decisions. As a consequence, even the more nuanced 
solution of the Appellate Body is ultimately about science patronising politics and 
infantilising, though in a technocratic perspective, those consumers who, 
notwithstanding science, may legitimately maintain a sceptical attitude and prefer 
the regulatory status quo. 103 
This calls for an intermediate position between populism and technocracy and, 
possibly, an alternative identity from those unproductively confronting each other in 
the Hormones litigation. Arguably, risk regulation could try out regulatory strategies 
recognising and shaping a ‘judicious consumer’. The latter, like the anxious 
consumer and the citizen consumer, cherishes self-government and political 
freedom. Nonetheless, similarly to the rational consumer, she relies also on science 
or, at least, expects that in regulating risks her representatives are thoroughly 
informed about the relevant scientific researches and debates. Science, however, is 
regarded as serving political decisions and, as such, it cannot pre-empt democracy. 
Accordingly, regulations protecting judicious consumers can legitimately address 
only well-informed anxieties, that is, concerns that have been the object of 
deliberation in the light of available scientific contributions. Notwithstanding this 
procedural step, self-government and politics keep the last word, which implies that 
protective measures may be ultimately enacted even without the validation of any 
expert.104 
 
Reforming the anxious consumer? 
At this juncture, the Hormones saga proceeds on a bifurcated path. At the WTO level, 
the EU was given 15 months to comply with the recommendations of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). Exchanges between EU and US officials and experts 
concerning the standards of enforcement of US veterinary programs were conducted 
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in that period but, after repeated reports of abuses in the use of hormones,105 the ban 
was not lifted and the deadline expired unsuccessfully. In 1999, the DSB authorised 
the US and Canada to impose retaliatory measures on EU imports. In the meantime, 
the EU commissioned further scientific research on the health risks related to the 
administration of hormones and, on that basis, a new directive allegedly complying 
with the DSB recommendations was adopted.106 In the new text, the ban on 
hormones was retained, although backed by a more comprehensive risk 
assessment.107 Predictably, the US and Canada regarded the new directive as merely 
perpetuating a twenty-year violation of international trade law and refused to lift 
their trade sanctions. As a response, the EU brought the dispute before the WTO 
adjudicative bodies. In this further stage, litigation involved procedural issues 
concerning the interpretation of the DSU and the scientific basis of the new 
legislation. In reviewing the new directive, the Panel embraced a strict scrutiny test 
and concluded that the EU had not complied with its SPS obligations on risk 
assessment and the precautionary principle.108 This finding was later reversed by the 
Appellate Body, which established that the Panel was not entitled to conduct de novo 
review and substitute its scientific judgment to that of the risk assessor.109 In this 
vein, it maintained that the EU was not required to observe conventional science, 
leaving room for the adoption of more contextualised risk assessments related to the 
chosen level of protection.110 However, even after the ruling of the Appellate Body it 
remained unclear whether the EU directive relied on an appropriate risk 
assessment.111 Thus, the Hormones saga continued at a diplomatic level, being 
temporarily settled with a memorandum of understanding whereby the US agreed to 
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reduce the sanctions imposed on EU products and the EU offered better market 
access for high-quality beef.112  
After the original rulings of the WTO adjudicative bodies, the Hormones dispute was 
resurrected at an EU level in the form of a liability action before the Court of First 
Instance. In Biret,113 a French company challenged the Council claiming damages 
ensuing from the prohibition on importing veal and beef from the US.114 Notably, the 
company urged the Court to conform to the ruling of the Appellate Body and, 
namely, to acknowledge that also for EU purposes the directives on the ban of 
hormones breached the SPS agreement. The Court dismissed the claim.115 In 
accordance with the case law on the domestic status of WTO norms,116 the Court held 
that SPS regulatory principles could not be successfully invoked in the EU legal 
order. Given that it was impossible to declare the directive illegal on these grounds, 
the first and essential requirement for a finding of liability for unlawful conduct was 
missed and compensation could not be awarded. 
This verdict was confirmed in appeal, although on different grounds.117 Here, the 
Court of Justice appeared in principle open to the idea of recognising direct effect to 
the WTO rulings after the expiry of the reasonable period of time for their 
implementation.118 Yet, in the case at issue the damages claimed by the appellant had 
occurred prior to that date and, therefore, the action was equally dismissed.119 
Compared with the Pasta litigation, the capacity of the WTO bodies for reforming the 
anxious consumer is much more limited. Even in the most recent version of its 
legislation, the EU maintains an obliging attitude towards its consumers, no matter if 
their anxieties have uncertain scientific foundations or could be met through less 
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restrictive measures. Many factors contribute to such an outcome. Firstly, the WTO 
system of remedies creates insufficient incentives to comply with SPS obligations, 
particularly in cases like Hormones where risk regulation is highly politicised. 
Secondly, the doctrines of the Court of Justice on the status of WTO obligations 
almost completely obstruct the penetration of international trade principles into the 
EU legal system, even when adjudicated by the Appellate Body.120 Thus, if EU 
political institutions perceive the enforcement of SPS obligations as pre-empting their 
margins of regulatory discretion, they can recoup them through selective exit 
strategies. Consequently, the transformative potential of WTO obligations is bound 
to remain unexpressed alongside the chance of curbing possible abuses by EU 
institutions. 
 
The challenges of the European fractured consumer 
Target of competing legal regimes pulling in different directions, the European 
consumer could not but give rise to a fractured subjectivity. Depending upon 
variable circumstances in policymaking and adjudication – such as the existence of 
cross-border elements in disputes, the adoption of EU legislation, the standards of 
judicial review employed and the rules of engagement between legal systems – 
consumers may in turn be patronised by protectionist or technocratic governments, 
enabled to make rational choices, protected from real or virtual hazards and even 
allowed to express political preferences. As long as the interactions between 
Europe’s regulatory strategies remain fluid and, ultimately, unsettled, 121 identities 
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are bound to coexist, compete and alternate, thus emphasising the functional 
diversity inherent in European legal pluralism.122 
Admittedly, the absence of a single or, at least, dominant regulatory strategy of 
consumer protection may seem regrettable insofar as it leaves regulators and 
adjudicators exposed to rival claims of legal authority and, apparently, short of a 
shared and stable conceptual framework. Still, viewed as a whole, a system relying 
on competing legal regimes of subjectification may turn out to be more attractive 
than a single coherent institutional setting purporting a unified and stylised 
conception of the consumer. With its array of identities, indeed, the European 
fractured consumer gives sophisticated legal expression to that highly problematic 
entity that is the contemporary consumer.123 By representing the latter contingent 
human condition and varying regulatory demands, not only does it offer a more 
articulate set of conceptual coordinates for structuring policymaking and 
adjudication, but it also contributes to a more accurate alignment of the European 
system of government with the actual nature of the individuals subject to its rule. 
Nevertheless, the discovery of the hidden virtues of European legal pluralism must 
not be equated with an unconditional defence of the regulatory status quo. 
Appealing at an analytical level, the fractured consumer also raises a number of 
normative issues, chief among them what could be named the problem of the 
deterioration of identities. The excursus provides broad empirical evidence of this 
phenomenon. It was noted for instance in Pasta that regulatory strategies conceived 
for maximising citizens’ political rights may end up infantilising consumers and 
narrowing their freedom of choice. Likewise, in Hormones, policies bolstering the 
confidence of individuals in the common market were conducive to obliging 
attitudes to anxiety and politics of fear. In short, each regulatory strategy is exposed 
to the constant risk of amplifying its inbuilt biases – an occurrence that if 
materialised may bring about an excessive tightening of identities, the 
transformation of their partiality in assertiveness and, ultimately, intractable conflicts 
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between regimes of subjectification. So, how should regulatory biases be handled? 
And how should the deterioration of identities be prevented?  
Here, the management of subjectivity faces a dual challenge concerning transparency 
and structural change. If it may be conceded that in many instances bias cannot be 
eliminated, it may also be maintained that it can be rendered more transparent and, 
at times, countered with competing biases.124 This invites some reconsideration on 
how the fractured consumer is assembled in adjudication and policymaking. It may 
be asked, for instance, whether in coping with competing regulatory strategies, 
synergies between them may be devised that may counter the deterioration of 
identities. Moreover, questions may arise as to whether the judicial reasoning 
actually employed in adjudicating consumer protection cases adequately illustrates 
the policy alternatives and the substantive stakes at hand. Finally, it may also be 
asked whether the arguments employed in judicial review offer persuasive 
justifications for the decisions inspiring the selection or accommodation of identities. 
In this respect, the picture emerging from Pasta and Hormones is a mixed one. 
Interestingly, at several stages the excursus has documented the possibility of 
convergent regulatory outcomes and constructive synergies between legal regimes of 
subjectification. Policies empowering rational consumers can effectively prevent their 
infantilisation resulting from unconstrained majoritarian democratic rule.125 The 
neglect of vulnerability associated with a rigid application of pro-choice strategies 
may be contrasted by policies acknowledging the limits of the information 
paradigm.126 Similarly, measures genuinely aimed at improving nutritional value 
and the quality of food can be an antidote to an aggressive enforcement of free 
movement principles.127 Finally, the degeneration of the confident consumer into an 
anxious one may also be tackled by either a renewed commitment to rationality and 
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science128 or, possibly, policies empowering the judicious consumer. In sum, Pasta 
and Hormones evoke a broader reality in which the regulatory strategies making up 
European legal pluralism may exert disciplinary effects on each other, counter their 
possible biases and induce, through a practice of latent conflict, structural changes at 
all levels.129 In this view, the notion of a division of labour between European legal 
systems130 and, as a reflection, relationships between them based on the idea of 
functional complementarity131 emerge as an attractive agenda to organise at an 
interpretive level the interactions between competing regulatory strategies and, for 
our more narrow purposes, avoid the deterioration of consumers’ identities.  
To fulfil this task, European courts may offer a key contribution. As repeatedly 
shown in the excursus, when deciding cases at the intersection between legal 
systems, courts represent the normative claims of their native legal systems with 
their corresponding regimes of subjectification. In addition, they are also in the 
position of engaging with the claims of their counterparts operating in related legal 
systems. Viewed from the angle of the fractured consumer, this function gains 
remarkably in perspective. Transnational adjudication is not just a process where 
courts passively witness the struggle for hegemony of consumers’ identities. Those 
disputes challenge the courts to articulate the terms of that competition and, where 
possible, devise synergies in the light of their functional complementarity.132 In this 
view, what may initially appear as the static opposition between the normative 
claims underlying rival identities can be reframed as an unfolding narrative across 
jurisdictions in which courts may be expected to regain at an argumentative level the 
coherence133 threatened by legal pluralism.134 Considering these high stakes, 
                                                        
128 See the Panel and Appellate Report in Hormones. 
129 N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 85-89. 
130 R. O. Kehoane. S. Macedo and A. Moravcisk, ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism’ (2009) 63 
International Organization, 1, at 9-22. 
131G. Majone, ‘The common sense of European integration’ (2006) Journal of European Public 
Policy, 607, at 619, arguing the notion of ‘distinctive institutional competence’.  
132 The duty of courts to take into account outside interpretive and normative claims may be 
grounded in both the integration clauses included in national constitutions and the reference to 
national constitutional identities introduced in article 4(2) TEU. I have argued this position more 
in detail in M. Dani, ‘Intersectional litigation and the structuring of a European interpretive 
community’ (2010) International Journal of Constitutional Law  (forthcoming). 
133 L. Moral Soriano, ‘A Modest Notion of Coherence in Legal reasoning. A Model for the European 
Court of Justice’ (2003) Ratio Juris, 296. 




alongside the risk of deadlock and conflict if this fundamental dynamic were not 
sufficiently grasped, it is all the more important to assess what adjudication delivers 
in practice. 
It is at this point that the excursus reveals its less gratifying side. This is not only 
because in quite a few instances the substantive outcomes of the cases reviewed may 
raise some eyebrows. Even more worrying is the process through which those 
outcomes are reached and, notably, the transparency and intelligibility of legal 
reasoning. In the vast majority of rulings, the most common adjudicative paradigm 
seems to be judicial unilateralism, and the indistinct use of the rhetoric of 
proportionality its technical concretisation. Despite the multiple ramifications of the 
Pasta and Hormones disputes, judicial reasoning follows prevailingly introverted 
patterns. Coherence and integrity are sought only in the internal dimension of the 
legal system through almost exclusive references to courts’ own precedents and 
doctrines. As a result, only from such an internal perspective the outcomes and 
arguments of rulings may seem persuasive. Yet, once the focus is widened to include 
the perspective of other regimes of subjectification, the contents of the same rulings 
are far from ideal and questions may be asked as to why judges have discarded 
potentially substitute identities. In legal reasoning traces of outside interpretive and 
normative claims are indeed scarce, and also previous judgments on the same or 
similar issues by courts belonging to related legal systems are frequently overlooked. 
Not only are references to those cases almost invariably omitted, but also discussion 
of their interpretive and normative claims is absent. To be sure, it can certainly occur 
that in their reasoning courts engage with arguments echoing those formulated by 
their counterparts. Yet, if that happens, they seem reluctant to acknowledge this 
explicitly and conceive their contribution to litigation as part of a broader 
coordinated judicial effort. A similar style of adjudication boils down to judgments 
apparently in denial of the high normative stakes inherent in those disputes. As a 
result, courts may be on the whole successful in expressing the original identities 
sustained by their legal systems. However, in failing to engage with the claims of 
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other courts, they fail to articulate the competition between the legal regimes of 
subjectification, ultimately bringing about a series of argumentatively segmented 
rulings. 
This calls for a more transparent and, on the whole, more ambitious style of 
adjudication in which courts enrich the interpretive and normative claims of their 
native legal systems with the discussion of outside competing claims. Put differently, 
assembling the fractured consumer in adjudication requires courts to address more 
openly normative issues such as the intrinsic value, the potential for deterioration 
and the transformative capacity of the identities posited by both their native and 
outside legal systems. All this may be achieved at an argumentative level by 
interfacing judgments and judicial reasoning. To establish a similar modus operandi, 
courts should first of all affirm the identities associated with their native legal 
system.135 At the same time, they should also conceive of themselves as parts of a 
transnational interpretive community sharing a common interpretive strategy to 
handle the disputes arising at the intersection of their legal orders. Such a strategy 
would not primarily pursue changes in the final outcomes of adjudication, although 
interesting implications could be envisaged also in that regard. Its main goal would 
be improving the quality of legal reasoning by instilling in each court a discipline of 
recognition and discussion of rival claims proffered by their counterparts. With this 
in mind, an initial proposal on how to assemble the fractured consumer in 
adjudication can now be advanced, alongside the implications that its adoption 
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Assembling the fractured consumer in adjudication 
From identities to a common interpretive strategy 
Fitting together the multiple identities of the European consumer in a coherent entity 
may well be considered a daunting task. The competition between regulatory 
strategies not only defies the very notion of devising a unified and sufficiently stable 
subjectivity but also challenges the prospect of capturing the contingent status of the 
consumer in judicial reasoning. Yet, at a closer look, the impediments of legal 
pluralism are not as insurmountable as they may initially seem. This is not 
tantamount to saying that the fragmentation of the legal regimes of subjectification 
can be transcended or that the identities making up the fractured consumer may be 
ordered or subsumed in an all-encompassing and reconciled super-entity. The task of 
assembling the fractured consumer cannot evade the reality of legal pluralism but, 
on the contrary, it is required to do the best by it. Indeed, it is precisely on a correct 
understanding of the dynamic inherent in European legal pluralism that an attempt 
to establish a higher degree of coherence and stability in the processes of 
subjectification can be pursued.  
The above analysis of the relationship between identities and their underlying 
regulatory strategies may illuminate this crucial passage. As noted, as things 
currently stand in Europe – and, most importantly, as confirmed by realist accounts 
of the consumers’ human condition – the claim of no legal regime of subjectification 
can be exclusively upheld because none of them has the independent status that 
would make its normative claims self-sufficient. That is why their competition is not 
meant to be solved once and for all or to be reconciled in a comprehensive 
constitutional framework promoting a unified notion of consumer.136 Conflicts 
between identities are there to be experienced routinely for the good they can yield, 
and any attempts to promote a dominant referent for consumer protection may be 
suspected of bias. In sum, the challenge of assembling the fractured consumer can be 
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best tackled at an argumentative level by construing contingent harmonies out of 
dissonances resulting from the interaction of its identities – an objective that could be 
attained through convergent practices of adjudication conceived in the light of the 
functional complementarity between the European legal regimes of subjectification. 
If this could constitute the general conceptual framework inspiring courts 
adjudicating in different jurisdictions, now it needs to be translated into a more 
operational interpretive strategy. At this more practical level, the multiplicity and 
incommensurability of European legal languages seem to clash with the core idea of 
common transnational interpretive efforts. A shared legal practice based more on 
rational persuasion and mutual engagement than on authority implies that courts 
recognise others’ claims, take into account each other’s perspectives and incorporate 
outside arguments into their judgments.137 This calls into question the plurality of 
European legal languages since recognition, discussion and incorporation of 
counterparts’ views are all operations that postulate if not a common medium, at 
least the possibility to communicate and interface claims conceived and framed in 
particular legal contexts. In promoting competing regulatory strategies, instead, 
European legal pluralism seems to preclude from the outset the possibility of 
developing argumentative ties between judicial rulings. It is at this juncture, 
however, that our insight on Pasta and Hormones may offer interesting elements of 
reflection and downplay initial difficulties with European legal pluralism. Upon 
closer investigation, in fact, the incommensurability of legal languages is only 
relative insofar as it has essentially to do with the stage of qualification of disputes. 
As noted, when it comes to defining the facts of a case and the interests at issue, 
courts draw from varying descriptive apparatuses reflecting, in turn, the 
fundamental rights, common market and international trade law projects. However, 
disputes on consumer protection are rarely decided at qualification. In the 
enforcement of both constitutive and regulatory principles, broad scope is left to 
proportionality review. Although also in this respect courts tend to adopt 
                                                        
137 L. B. Tremblay, ‘The legitimacy of judicial review: The limits of dialogue between courts and 
legislatures’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 617, at 630-634, and J. H. H. 
Weiler, ‘Epilogue: The Judicial Après Nice’ in G. de Búrca and J. H. H. Weiler, The European Court 
of Justice (OUP, 2001), 215, at 225. 




remarkably different standards of adjudication, the framework of proportionality 
emerges as the closest thing to a common language that they can employ to establish 
a degree of mutuality in their interpretative efforts.138 In fact, standards of 
adjudication are not rigidly mandated by legal texts and courts enjoy important 
margins of discretion in that regard. This is of paramount importance for the 
definition of a common interpretive strategy. Whereas European grammars remain 
incommensurable, proportionality is the syntax by means of which rival normative 
claims and, as a reflection, competing identities voiced at the stage of qualification 
can be mediated. Actual outcomes of adjudication already bear traces of this reality 
as it has been often at the stage of justification that discrepancies between the 
multiple identities of the fractured consumer have been bridged and some degree of 
convergence between them promoted. 
On these premises, courts may certainly continue to qualify cases through the 
distinct notions and conceptual approaches mandated by the legal regimes of 
subjectification to which they are bound. However, if the differences between their 
particular claims are to be bridged, courts may also be expected to develop a sort of 
cubist sensibility whereby they must grasp the reality of a case from all the relevant 
directions at once. This means that courts would not only be required to observe the 
norms and precedents of their own legal system, but they should also try to ensure a 
degree of external coherence between their respective judgments by recognising and 
engaging with the claims formulated by courts operating in other legal regimes. As 
mentioned, proportionality review is the stage for performing this critical task. Thus, 
in choosing their standard of judicial review, courts could also take into account the 
interpretive and normative claims proffered in related legal orders and justify on 
policy grounds their final decisions as to the consumer identity to be enforced. In 
particular, if other judges have already decided the same dispute, courts could defer 
to those prior judgments as providing the default solution also for their case.139 By 
setting their standard of review at the type of proportionality test previously applied 
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by their counterparts, courts would ensure a higher degree of external coherence in 
adjudication and contribute also to the stabilisation of the identities previously 
enforced. 
Yet, coherence is not just the result of obedience to previous judgments. Overriding 
policy reasons associated with the integrity of its native legal system may arise that 
could still induce a court to disregard earlier rulings,140 apply its original standard of 
adjudication and, ultimately, contest received outside judicial wisdom.141 In fact, it is 
precisely through episodes of this kind that the different regulatory strategies may 
exert their mutual disciplinary effects and promote structural change. However, 
since the overruling of previous judgments may also trigger intractable conflicts, 
courts should make sure to operate that move constructively. For one, they should 
frame the conflict in argumentative rather than authoritative terms. Put differently, 
an overruling may be more convincing if conducted not as a purported exercise of 
ultimate authority but insofar as more persuasive reasons are advanced. In this view, 
if a court decides to depart from previous judgments, a supplement of judicial 
reasoning seems necessary.142 After having referred to the previous ruling, therefore, 
that court should engage in an in-depth discussion of its arguments and explain with 
robust reasoning why they are not persuasive or why the identity therein promoted 
should be avoided in favour of a competing one. Next, the substantive impact of the 
overruling on rival interpretive and normative claims should be minimised. This 
means that among the possible alternative solutions to a case, courts should opt for 
the one with the lesser impact on the regulatory strategies of the related legal 
systems. In this way, also from a substantive perspective the deviation from previous 
rulings would be limited and the collision between identities kept under control.  
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Pasta and Hormones revisited 
But how would this interpretive strategy have functioned in Pasta and Hormones? 
Would it really make a difference? How would it improve the transparency of 
adjudication and management of identities? An immediate way of testing its impact 
may be to re-examine those disputes and briefly revisit the sequence of their steps in 
the light of the guidelines illustrated above. 
The excursus on Pasta started with Bottiglieri and Caruso and Moja, both cases 
concerning purely internal situations. In that context, litigation is framed through 
domestic notions and concepts drawn from the language of fundamental rights, 
namely economic freedom and its limits. At the stage of proportionality review, both 
judgments may cause perplexities. Criticism, however, is not primarily related to a 
lack of deference to outside claims or the failure to grasp the potential external 
ramifications of the disputes. In fact, already in reviewing those rulings it was 
pointed out not only that their net result is a patronising attitude to the consumer 
but, even more critically, that their judicial reasoning falls short even of the loose 
standards of the rationality test. Nonetheless, particularly in Moja, a more deferential 
attitude to the EU normative claims could have led the Italian Constitutional Court if 
not to anticipate, at least to envisage the solution achieved by the Court of Justice in 
Zoni. At that time, Dassonville143 was already an established precedent and, for a 
sensible court, it could be apparent that the measure under scrutiny amounted to a 
potential obstacle to intra-Community trade. True, Moja was a purely internal 
situation, but the Constitutional Court could have however envisaged in an obiter 
dictum the possibility that, if applied to imports, the legislation on pasta would have 
run afoul of article 34 TFEU. 
Our interpretive strategy may have a more evident impact in Zoni, the judgment 
where the Court of Justice declared that the pasta legislation infringed article 34. 
Whereas in that case the Court correctly qualifies litigation with common market 
categories, it does not seem to completely abide by subsequent guidelines on 
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proportionality and deference. Indeed, not only the outcomes of Bottiglieri and Caruso 
and Moja are not incorporated in that ruling, but from its wording it is not entirely 
clear whether the Court of Justice was aware of them. With essentially introverted 
arguments, Zoni articulates rather mechanically the regulatory framework of the 
common market project. Scrutiny of the national measure conforms to a pure balance 
test, and only implicitly do the arguments inspiring national constitutional 
adjudication feature in its reasoning. This is not meant to criticise the substantive 
outcome of that pronouncement. Rather, it is its external argumentative dimension 
that seems underdeveloped. In fact, the Court of Justice, while acknowledging 
Bottiglieri and Caruso and Moja, could have however departed from them and reached 
the substantive solution it actually endorsed. As noted, overruling remains a possible 
option that, however, requires the respect of a couple of precautions concerning 
judicial reasoning and substantive impact. Accordingly, the Court of Justice could 
have referred to Bottiglieri and Caruso and Moja engaging openly with their 
arguments. The lenient application of the rationality test could have been subject to 
critical remarks and also the infantilised consumer could have been discussed and 
contrasted with the competing notion of the rational consumer. As to its substantive 
impact, the ruling in Zoni seems more considerate. Among the possible alternative 
outcomes of the case, the Court of Justice adopted the solution with the least impact 
on national constitutional principles and policymaking. Targeting only cross-border 
situations, the ruling did not affect the possibility that Italy might implement its 
industrial policies and constitutional norms in purely internal situations. The coming 
of the rational consumer, therefore, was limited as well as its capacity to reshape and 
interfere with the domestic regime of subjectification. 
That work was carried out in Pepi and Catto, the case that probably provides the 
clearest example of deference to previous rulings. Although in that judgment 
definitions are taken from the vocabulary of national constitutionalism, 
proportionality review is tuned in the substantive outcome of Zoni. Despite this, one 
may note that in the reasoning of the Constitutional Court deference to Zoni seems 
essentially justified by reasons concerning the formal authority of EU law and its 
supreme interpreter. Little or nothing transpires on what the Constitutional Court 




thinks of the merit of that ruling and its underlying conceptual and ideological 
assumptions. Does the model of the rational consumer fit with domestic 
constitutional law? What is its relationship with the notion of citizenship and its 
political rights? Why and under what circumstances should it prevail over it? None 
of these questions finds an explicit answer in the reasoning of the case and one is left 
with the impression that the Constitutional Court, rather than engaging with outside 
interpretive claims, is simply surrendering to them. 
Comments made for the initial stages of the Pasta litigation could be repeated almost 
verbatim for the outset of the Hormones dispute. Fedesa may be criticised for the 
lenient standard of review of EU legislation employed by the Court of Justice as well 
as its complacent attitude to consumers’ anxiety. Yet, that line of criticism is purely 
internal to the EU legal system since at that time there were no previous external 
rulings to defer to and also international trade law did not provide clear alternative 
normative claims. In particular the use of the rationality test could be questioned. 
The adoption of that standard of review at a domestic level matches with the broad 
endowment of political rights to citizens and with the prominence of representative 
democracy as the main strategy to deal with economic, social and political conflicts. 
Transferred to an EU level, the same approach appears more problematic. In this 
context, political powers do not enjoy the same democratic credentials of national 
policymaking. In Fedesa, for instance, the directive at issue had been adopted only 
with the consultation of the European Parliament, a procedure which could justify a 
stricter scrutiny on the resulting legislative measure. 
Similarly, the assessment of the WTO segment of Hormones could echo the arguments 
developed in revisiting Zoni. In their reports, both the Panel and the Appellate Body 
frame their arguments exclusively through the lexicon of international trade law. In 
reviewing the proportionality of the EU measure, Fedesa is not even mentioned, 
although its main arguments are at least implicitly considered and criticised. Even at 
this stage, therefore, our interpretive strategy could play an important contribution 
in terms of transparency by articulating the normative stakes inherent in the conflict 
between the EU and the WTO approaches to risk regulation. If the WTO adjudicative 
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bodies wanted to depart from Fedesa, they could have discussed it and, for instance, 
contested the prominence gained by lay voices over science in EU legislation and 
adjudication. Their rulings, instead, develop only in the WTO internal dimension, 
without any attempt to persuade external interlocutors. If in Hormones this 
argumentative dimension is neglected, the substantive outcome of the Appellate 
Body report seems at least to conform to the second precaution assisting the 
overruling of earlier judgments. In fact, in reviewing with stricter standards the 
measure at hand in Fedesa, the Appellate Body opts for the less impactful solution. As 
noted, risk assessment is established as a necessary requirement of hormones 
regulation, but science and the renewed commitment to the rational consumer do not 
seem to completely rule out members’ political discretion and their possibility of 
responding to consumers’ anxieties. 
Finally, our interpretive strategy could have shed some interesting light also on the 
EU follow-up to Hormones. In Biret the Court of First Instance qualified the case with 
the EU vocabulary on the liability for unlawful conduct and on that basis openly 
disregarded the WTO rulings in Hormones. In principle, such a move would have 
been possible, although the reasons for this lack of deference should have been 
spelled out in more detail. No substantive justification is attached to that judgment as 
arguments focus only on the formalistic aspect concerning the lack of authority of 
WTO law within the EU legal order. By stressing the lack of direct effect of WTO/SPS 
obligations, the Court evades the discussion of the WTO normative claims and ends 
up establishing a shield against all WTO rulings irrespective of their actual content, 
as if in that dimension substantive and argumentative coherence were not worth 
pursuing at all.  
But considering the established doctrines, could the Court of First Instance rule 
differently? In this respect, at least two arguments may be advanced to suggest that a 
more deferential attitude was possible. Firstly, the Court of Justice in appeal showed 
that a more accurate interpretation of the WTO agreements may lead to the 
recognition of a limited direct effect of SPS obligations after the end of the reasonable 




period of time for the implementation of WTO rulings.144 Although opposed in more 
recent case law, that solution confirms that a more open approach to WTO rulings is 
a viable option and also that external coherence can be attempted in that direction. 
Secondly, it can be argued that despite the doctrine on the lack of direct effect the 
Court of Justice could have however engaged with the substantive issues addressed 
by the WTO adjudicative bodies. In fact, one does not need to recognise the direct 
effect of SPS obligations to introduce in the EU legal system a proportionality test 
including consistency review or a stricter assessment of the scientific foundations of a 
measure.145 And also if the EU was not persuaded by a reaffirmation of the rational 
consumer paradigm, it could however oppose it by overruling WTO judgments on 
substantive grounds. Solutions relying on the judicious consumer and, notably, on 
the notion of maintaining protective measures irrespective of their scientific 




A by-product of European legal pluralism, the fractured consumer may turn out to 
provide a useful notion to cope with the quagmires of contemporary mass-
consumption societies. With its array of identities, it seems sufficiently articulate to 
project into the legal sphere a number of salient circumstances arising from the 
experience of consumption. It is sufficiently flexible to avoid unilateral and stylised 
representations and it is also problematic, as much as the human condition of its 
factual referent.  
Managing in adjudication competing legal regimes of subjectification is a highly 
demanding task. It requires a supplement of judicial effort, namely a shared 
interpretive strategy that takes into account both the promises and biases of 
                                                        
144 The issue is discussed in M. Dani, ‘Remedying European Legal Pluralism – The Fiamm and 
Fedon litigation and the judicial protection of international trade bystanders’ (2010) 21 European 
Journal of International Law, 303. 
145 See Pfizer, cit. at nt 88, paragraphs 199 and 270. 
Marco Dani 
                                                                                                                                      
45
consumers’ identities as well as the potential for synergies between their underlying 
regulatory frameworks. However, even if a consensus should emerge on a common 
adjudicative approach, assembling the fractured consumer would remain an ongoing 
challenge, delivering contingent results and provoking endless debate.  
In this view, assembling the fractured European consumer is an effort that by no 
means can be surrendered to the courts. In this respect, the conceptual framework 
associated with the fractured consumer may turn out to be appealing also beyond 
adjudication. Political discussion on consumer regulation can only gain from a more 
overt definition of its general policy coordinates. In the same vein, the prospect of 
complementary relationships between legal regimes of subjectification may also 
seem attractive for the elaboration of nonjudicial strategies in transnational circuits of 
policy-making.146 Admittedly, those are rarely places for outspoken debate and 
transparent deliberation. Nonetheless, by unveiling the legal regimes of 
subjectification operating in Europe, with their regulatory strategies, dynamics and 
favourite identities, the fractured consumer may highlight precisely the historical 
contingency and biases of policy outcomes, encourage their contestation and, 
ultimately, contribute to mobilising a broader range of actors than the restricted 
circles routinely involved in judicial politics. 
As Rose has observed, ‘new modes of subjectification produce new modes of 
exclusion and new practices for reforming the persons so excluded’.147 This seems 
particularly true for the consumer. As documented also in this article, the rise of the 
consumer has meant if not the demise,148 at least the transformation or relativisation 
of citizenship and the social practices traditionally attached to it.149 In this process, 
outward values such as civic participation and solidarity are being challenged by the 
inwardness of freedom of choice and self-realisation.150 The difficult coexistence of 
                                                        
146 Sunstein, cit. nt 31, at 9. 
147 Rose, cit. at nt 7, at 196. 
148 Z. Baumann, ‘Exit Homo Politicus, Enter Homo Consumens’, in Soper and Trentmann, cit. at nt 
14, at 139. 
149 Rose, cit. at nt 54, at 164-166. 
150 R. Bin, ‘I diritti di chi non consuma’, relazione al Convegno Diritti dell’individuo e diritti del 
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ideals of the self that have such opposing approaches to active liberty is a source of 
concern that could hardly be overstated. The legal and political instances in which 
the fractured consumer is assembled provide a formidable laboratory to investigate, 
reflect and criticise that process.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
<http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/content/view/3/3/#b> (last consulted December 
2010). 
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